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ABSTRACT: In this paper I offer a characterization of evaluative realism, present the intuitive case against it, and offer 
two considerations to support it further: one concerning the internalist connection between values and mo-
tivation, and the other concerning the intuitive causal inefficacy of evaluative properties. The considera-
tions ultimately rely on the former intuitions themselves, but are not devoid of interest, as they might make 
one revise what one took to be his own realistic supporting intuitions, if such one had. 
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In this paper I want to present a case against evaluative realism. The considerations I 
will submit will not constitute a refutation of it, given that in the central points they 
dwell on intuitions that, if sound, would support rejecting realism quite directly, with 
the result that as arguments they might be accused of begging the question. For better 
or for worse, I think that no stronger case against (nor for) evaluative realism is forth-
coming. But this does not make the considerations worthless, I hope, for they make 
explicit some of the consequences of the realist approach. To the extent to which one 
regards them as counterintuitive, the considerations may eventually make one revise 
one’s judgments about what one took to be one’s own relevant intuitions. 
 The paper is divided into six sections. In the first section I focus on the target: tak-
ing some earlier work of mine as my starting-point, I propose to characterize evalua-
tive realism as rejecting what I call the flexibility of values, in contrast to other pro-
posals that make evaluative realism either too easy or too hard. In the second section I 
present the particular flexible account of values I would favor, which is mainly due to 
David Lewis, and the scenarios whose intuitive description (I take it) strongly favor 
this flexibility, which are variants of the “Moral Twin Earth” submitted to related aims 
by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons. People quite often claim, nonetheless, that 
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they do not share the relevant flexibility supporting intuitions. The two main consid-
erations I will offer aim to urge them to revise what they take to be their own intui-
tions. In section three I will claim that evaluative realism, including the dispositional 
variety of it, cannot account for internalism about values. In section four I will also 
consider the somewhat trickier case of internalism about value-judgments. In section 
five I will present the Missing Explanation Argument, due to Mark Johnston, to the 
effect that flexible properties cannot be involved in causally explaining general disposi-
tions of subjects to respond in certain ways, and I will claim that evaluative properties 
intuitively do not appear in such explanations. And finally in section six I will consider 
why, on the face of it, this is compatible with the views about so-called moral explana-
tions of philosophers like Nicholas Sturgeon.  
1. Evaluative Realism vs. the Flexibility of Values 
The diversity of views intended under the label of “realism” is in my view particularly 
acute with regard to realism about evaluative properties. Before presenting the one I 
will use, I want to briefly mention some alternatives that, in my view, make evaluative 
realism either too easy or too hard. 
 Consider for instance what is offered by Geoffrey Sayre-McCord: 
Realism involves embracing just two theses: (1) that claims in question, when literally construed, 
are literally true or false (cognitivism), and (2) some are literally true. Nothing more. (1988b, p. 5) 
I think it should be clear that realism so conceived will be a quite uncontroversial po-
sition. To illustrate, consider a caricature-like subjectivist account of values, having it 
that something like the following defines being good: 
 x is good iff we value x. 
False as it might be for other reasons, the proposal does satisfy (1) and (2) and hence 
would be a realist proposal conceived in this way. But if this counts as realist, almost 
any possible view would as well.1 Adding an epistemic element of the sort 
It is possible to find out about some moral sentences that they are true. (Thomson 
1998a, p. 171) 
does not seem to change the situation, since on occasions we can clearly find out what 
we value.  
 So it seems that one might have a non-realist approach to evaluative properties 
that respects that instantiations of them make simple predications of predicates signi-
fying them straightforwardly, and sometimes knowably, true. On the other side, and, I 
                                                     
1 I don’t mean to suggest that Sayre-McCord is unaware of this, quite the contrary: he explicitly considers 
various possible “subjectivist” positions as varieties of realism, see (Sayre-McCord 1988b, pp. 16-9). 
It is only in this “cheap” sense, I take it, that Lewis himself describes his position as a realist one: val-
ues as he conceives them “do exist”, see (Lewis 1989, p. 93). For a similar view, consider Jackson: 
“Realists [are] cognitivists [who have it that the statements in question are semantically truth-apt] who 
take the extra step of holding that the ethical properties are instantiated” (Jackson 1998, p. 128). 
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take it, motivated by considerations like those just submitted, David Brink says the 
following: 
A moral realist thinks that moral claims should be construed literally; there are moral facts and 
true moral propositions. Ethics is objective, then, insofar as it concerns matters of fact and inso-
far as moral claims can be true or false (and some of them are true). But moral realism claims that 
ethics is objective in another sense, which is not always distinguished, from this first kind of ob-
jectivity. Not only does ethics concerns matter of fact, it concerns facts that hold independently 
of anyone’s belief about what is right or wrong. This first kind of objectivity distinguishes moral 
realist and other cognitivist theories form nihilism and noncognitivism; the second kind of objec-
tivity distinguishes moral realism from constructivist version of cognitivism. (1989, p. 20) 
As this is worded, though, it might seem that it also allows our caricature-like subjec-
tivist above to count as a realist, as according to her the relevant responses on which 
goodness depends were not anyone’s “belief about what is right or wrong” but rather 
a given connative attitude: valuing. But let us interpret Brink more liberally, as holding 
that evaluative realism requires that evaluative properties have essences that are inde-
pendent of relevant subjective mental responses, regardless of whether they are doxa-
stic or not. So understood, it would certainly exclude our subjectivist. But the problem 
now is that arguably it would exclude too much. There is a sense in which dispositions 
have natures that are not independent on their manifestations: dispositions can be 
possessed when the manifestation does not occur, to be sure, but their relation to 
them is part of their essences, of what makes them the properties they are.2 Take, for 
instance, dispositionalism about colors. According to the view, colors are dispositions 
to produce in certain subjects, say, normal human perceivers as they actually are, cer-
tain mental responses, say, the experience of a certain color being instantiated, under 
certain conditions, say, normal viewing conditions as they actually are. Hence colors 
have natures that involve mental responses. This, one may say, makes a difference 
with respect to the alternative so-called primary view about colors: according to disposi-
tionalism colors are less than fully objective properties, but this is not so according to 
the primary view. But both views arguably are, and are certainly taken to be, varieties 
of realism about colors. Mutatis mutandis, one should expect, for the case of values: a 
view according to which values are fully objective properties, whose natures are inde-
pendent of any mental subjective response, should certainly count as a form of evalua-
tive realism. I will refer to such a view as (evaluative) objectivism. But realism should not 
require objectivism by definition. 
 It is worth noticing that arguably both for primary, fully objective properties, and 
for secondary, real but dispositional, properties, broadly conceived Fregean considera-
tions require that there should be some descriptive material that fixes that they are 
signified by certain expressions and concepts. And in the case of colors, they arguably 
involve precisely the relevant chromatic subjective responses. For reasons that are fa-
miliar from Kripke (1980), this suffices for the following to be not only true but also a 
priori 
                                                     
2 See Fine (1994) for an elaboration of the view on essences I am relying on here, and García-Carpintero 
(2002) for the application to the distinction dispositional vs. categorical.  
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x is red iff x is disposed to produce in normal human perceivers an experience as 
of red in normal viewing conditions  
even if only contingently true. According to these realist views about colors, you only 
get something that holds necessarily by rigidifying on the relevant expressions, as in 
x is red iff x is disposed to produce in normal human perceivers as they actually are 
an experience as of red in normal viewing conditions as they actually are.  
That is something that both “primarists” and dispositionalists can, and do, hold. As 
suggested, the difference between them seems to lie in whether they hold that the 
former holds in virtue of the nature of the color or not, see García-Carpintero (2002) and 
Wedgwood (1998) —and in my view, to settle this question, a posteriori considerations 
provided by the specialist are required. 
 I think that something like this is precisely characteristic of realism about colors, 
and this is what I propose to generalize. Let me say then that if F is a property, an rd 
biconditional for (a predicate signifying) it is a substantial biconditional of the form: 
x is f iff x has the disposition to produce in subjects S the mental response R under 
conditions C 
or the form 
x is f iff subjects S have the disposition to issue the x-directed mental response R 
under conditions C 
where ‘is f ’ signifies F, and ‘substantial’ is there to avoid “whatever-it-takes” specifica-
tions of either S, R or C.3
 Let me also say that a specification of the subjects in an rd biconditional is rigid iff 
the relevant predicate involved in the specification is rigid,4 and flexible otherwise. Take 
for instance ‘normal human perceiver.’ This is not, as it stands, a rigid specification. 
For take the relevant predicate ‘is a normal human perceiver’ and suppose that in the 
actual world, it is true (even if knowable only a posteriori) that being such is being a 
                                                     
3 One such “whatever-it-takes” specification of, say, subjects S would be “those subjects, however they 
be, such that something is disposed to produce in them responses R under conditions C iff it is F.” 
Mutatis mutandis for the responses and the conditions. 
4 I am assuming, with Kripke (1980), and a lot of people in discussions on philosophy of mind, philoso-
phy of science or metaethics, that the notion of rigidity might be extended to be applicable to predi-
cates, roughly along the lines of: a predicate is rigid iff it signifies the same property in all relevant 
worlds. Proposals like this have recently received criticisms, among which: that it would trivialize, 
making all predicates trivially rigid (see for instance Soames 2002), and that in any case it would over-
generalize, counting as rigid predicates some that do not signify natural properties/kinds (see for in-
stance Schwartz 2002). I try to respond to these criticisms, respectively, in my unpublished ‘Rigidity 
for Predicates and the Trivialization Problem’ and ‘The Over-Generalization Problem: Predicates 
Rigidly Signifying the “Unnatural.”‘ In the latter I also argue that the relevant simple predicates like 
those that will concern us here, ‘is red,’ ‘is funny,’ ‘is good’ and the like are, nonetheless, rigid. Given 
this I will speak of them signifying properties, without relativizing such talk to worlds.  
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human with a perceptual apparatus meeting condition ABC. Now consider a counter-
factual situation in which, for whatever reason you might think of, the human perceiv-
ers that are normal there are those with a perceptual apparatus meeting the different 
condition DEF. Now intuitively, it is this other property of being a human with a per-
ceptual apparatus meeting condition DEF which would be relevant for evaluating sen-
tences containing ‘is a normal human perceiver’ with respect to this other world. But 
then ‘is a normal human perceiver’ is not a rigid predicate, but a flexible one. Its rele-
vant rigidification, which can be put as something like ‘is a normal human perceiver as 
they actually are’ leads nonetheless to a rigid specification of the subjects, of the sort 
‘normal human perceivers as they actually are.’  
 An rd biconditional is rigid iff it involves a rigid specification of the subjects, and is 
flexible otherwise. Finally, a given property is flexible iff there is a flexible rd bicondi-
tional for (a predicate signifying) it which holds (a priori and) in virtue of its nature and 
hence necessarily.5  
 With all these stipulations I can state my proposal about realism thus: 
 A property is real iff it is not a flexible property. 
What considerations would be relevant for the issue as to whether a given predicate 
signifies a real vs. a flexible property?  
 Suppose that ‘is f ’ signifies6 property F, and suppose that S and C are the relevant 
flexible specifications of subjects and conditions, and S@ and C@ their relevant rigidi-
fications, and that the only relevant rd biconditionals are 
(R) x is f  iff x is disposed to produce in S@ the response R under conditions C@. 
(F) x is f  iff x is disposed to produce in S the response R under conditions C. 
Both are, we may suppose, true with respect to the actual world and, we may also 
suppose, a priori knowably so. But the following asymmetry arises; abstracting now 
from issues about essence vs. necessity, their metaphysical status covaries with the na-
ture of F as stated in 
F is real  iff (R) is necessary iff (F) is contingent 
F is flexible  iff (R) is contingent iff (F) is necessary. 
This provides a way of testing whether ‘is f ’ signifies a real or a flexible property, and 
based just on a priori considerations. The recipe is, very abstractly put, this: consider 
what could be a counterexample of the necessity of the relevant statement on the as-
sumption that the predicate signifies one particular kind of property. I will refer to 
them as target situations. Then check how these should be intuitively described (with re-
spect to the relevant predicate) and conclude accordingly. 
                                                     
5 This is the notion labeled flexible response-dependence in López de Sa (2003). I am abstracting here from is-
sues related to response-dependence.  
6 See footnote 4 above. 
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 I will instantiate this sort of relevant consideration in the next section. But let me 
end this one with the following remark about words. The question of the appropriate-
ness of labels per se, when philosophical terms are at issue, does not appear to be par-
ticularly interesting philosophically, once the relevant distinctions are clear and attended 
to. There certainly seems to be a contrast between entirely objective properties and 
dispositional properties, on the one side, and flexible properties, on the other, as issued in 
the question of how the relevant target situations should be intuitively described. My 
aim here is to present a case against the view that evaluative properties are of the former 
kind, whatever they are called. As I said, though, I will call them real properties. 
2. A Flexible Lewisian Theory of Values and the Intuitions about Evaluative Twin Earth 
That some evaluative properties are intuitively flexible is, I take it, quite uncontrover-
sial. Consider the case of ‘is funny.’ Suppose that the following are the relevant flexi-
ble and rigidified rd biconditionals 
x is funny iff x is disposed to amuse us under appropriately attentive conditions. 
x is funny iff x is disposed to amuse us as we actually are under appropriately at-
tentive conditions as they actually are. 
Now take something funny, even something, as I am ready and willing to grant, really 
really funny, like The Simpsons. Gerald Lang suggests that we would not take very seri-
ously the suggestion that it “would continue to be funny even if a comprehensive al-
teration in our comic sensibilities took place” (Lang 2001, p. 201). That is, in a very 
compressed form, an instance of the relevant consideration we have just considered, 
to the effect that being funny is flexible and not real. As there is no doubt that The 
Simpsons is actually funny, there is no doubt that it is disposed to amuse us as we actu-
ally are under appropriately attentive conditions as they actually are. Consider now a 
relevant counterfactual target situation, w, in which this alteration of our sensibilities 
takes place, but which, apart from this, resembles the actual world as much as possi-
ble. The Simpsons is not disposed to amuse us as we would be in w under appropriate atten-
tive conditions as they would be in w. 
 So far we have the relevant target situation, appropriately neutrally described, as no 
hypothesis about the extension of ‘is funny’ with respect to w is introduced. Hence, that 
it is a possibility is something agreeable by both defenders of the view that ‘is funny’ 
signifies a real property and defenders of the view that it signifies a flexible one. The 
crucial question is now: how should it be intuitively described with respect to ‘is 
funny’? In particular, is it true or false, intuitively, that ‘The Simpsons is funny’ when 
evaluated with respect to w? Lang says that we would not even take seriously the sugges-
tion that it might be true. But now, if ‘The Simpsons is funny’ is false with respect to w 
and ‘The Simpsons is disposed to amuse us as we actually are under appropriately atten-
tive conditions, as they actually are’ is true with respect to w, the rigidified bicondi-
tional is only contingently true with respect to the actual world. Hence, ‘is funny’ sig-
nifies a flexible property, and not a real one. 
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 One might say: “But we do say, at least sometimes, that The Simpsons is funny, in 
the objective mood, as it were, rather that we find them funny. Furthermore, we say those 
things even acknowledging that they may not amuse some people, for after all some 
days, although funny, they don’t even amuse us. Why couldn’t we say then that The 
Simpsons are really funny even in the target situation, only that those unlucky people 
fail to be disposed to be amused by them?” The straight answer is that we could defi-
nitely say this: it’s only that intuitively we, or at least most of us, don’t want to. Re-
member that the crucial issue is how a given target situation should be intuitively de-
scribed. In the submitted consideration, there is also another important element which 
is worth stressing to avoid possible misunderstandings. The fact that we have simple 
predicates like ‘is funny’ signifying the property of being funny arguably entails that 
there should be a “real”/appearance distinction concerning what is funny, that being 
funny should be distinct from seeming funny or actually amusing. But that of course is 
also the case even if funny is a flexible property, and hence in particular does not entail any-
thing about what the proper intuitive description of target situations should be. There 
are things which seem funny even though they are not really funny at all (see (Wright 
1992, p. 101) for a dozen examples of this) and conversely, as submitted, The Simpsons 
are funny even if they sometimes fail to seem so. But that is indeed entailed by the use 
of the dispositional idiom in the rd biconditionals. Dispositions can be possessed with-
out issuing their characteristic manifestations. And conversely, their manifestation 
could occur without being the manifestation of a possessed disposition. Flexible prop-
erties are not dispositions, true enough. But with respect to each world, the things that 
have a given flexible property in this world are those that are disposed to produce the 
relevant response in the subjects as they are in that world under the conditions as they 
are in that world. Hence, in each world, having the property, being funny, is not the 
same as issuing the relevant response, seeming funny. 
 The same situation occurs, I claim, for a number of similar soft evaluative predi-
cates: ‘is tasty’, ‘is disgusting’, ‘is comfortable’, not to mention ‘is sexy,’ ‘is fashionable’, 
or ‘is cool.’ With respect to any of these, it seems, hardly anyone would claim to have 
the intuitions supporting their signifying real properties. Does it generalize with re-
spect to all evaluative predicates, including the hard cases of moral and some aesthetic 
predicates? Consider the following general rd biconditional, adapted from the pro-
posal by David Lewis in his ‘Dispositional Theories of Value’ (1989): 
x is good iff we are disposed to value x in appropriate reflective conditions. 
Some remarks are in order. First, valuing is the favorable attitude of desiring to desire. 
That valuing is a desiderative rather than a doxastic attitude is arguably entailed by its 
being a favorable attitude. But “first order” desiring would certainly not do: we, unfortu-
nately quite often, desire things we do not value at all. Weakness of will is, of course, a 
case at hand. Take “unwilling smokers,” as one might call them, like myself. I desire to 
smoke a Ducados quite often, I actually love smoking. But I find some uneasiness even 
in reporting it as I have just done. It is not, or at least not only, that I have a contrasting 
desire not to smoke: that would be a case of conflicting desires —which by the way 
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could eventually issue in conflicting valuings or even in moral dilemmas. But phe-
nomenologically, my case of smoking is not, or at least is not only, constituted by 
what I experience when for instance I have contrasting desires about enjoying a good 
film this afternoon or remaining in my office finishing this paper. In this case I do not 
want to be rid of either desire: I would prefer the world to be so that they could both 
be satisfied, but unfortunately I will have to act upon only one of them. My smoking 
is different: I do want to be rid of my desirings to smoke: even if I desire to smoke, I 
desire not to desire to smoke at all. So that, when I light I cigarette, I’d say that my will 
is weak, given that I desire not to have the desire that makes me do so. So failing to 
desire as one values is failing to desire as one desires to desire. Hence, it seems, valu-
ing is desiring to desire.7
 Second, we are, according to the proposal, those that are disposed to value, with re-
spect to the relevant particular issue at stake, exactly like the speaker. It is important to 
stress that, so understood, ‘we’ turns out to be a flexible characterization of a group of 
subjects. The relevant predicate signifies with respect to the actual world the property 
of being relevantly the way I am actually. But I could be otherwise, and in particular my 
disposition to value could be very different from what it actually is. But then, with re-
spect to those worlds in which I am suitably different, it will signify the property of 
being relevantly the way I would be in those situations. 
 Third and finally, appropriate reflective conditions are rather schematic. In Lewis’ origi-
nal paper, he submits that the relevant conditions are the conditions of fullest possible 
imaginative acquaintance with the thing in question, possible for the subjects in ques-
tion and relatively to the thing in question (Lewis 1989, pp. 77-9). This element has 
met with some resistance in the literature (see for instance Johnston (1989) and Smith 
(1994)). Some would claim that further elements should be included, notably aware-
ness of all (non-evaluative) relevant facts. I tend to agree with Lewis that this further 
element, crucial for the question of balancing different probably conflicting values, 
should not be included in the conditions determining the values to be balanced in the 
first place (see Lewis 1989, pp. 79-82). But the issue is delicate, and I would rather not 
go into it here. My proposal is then to characterize the relevant conditions as the appro-
priately reflective conditions, having in mind these Lewisian conditions of fullest possible 
imaginative acquaintance, but perhaps also some others like the ones considered if 
further thought renders them appropriate. 
 Let me come back to the issue at hand. It would seem that if ‘is good’ signifies a 
flexible property then arguably all evaluative predicates do so as well.8 Does it? As we 
                                                     
7 In the meantime, and fortunately, I quit. Fur further discussion of the objections against the sufficiency 
of desiring to desire for valuing, and of its necessity, see my unpublished ‘What is Valuing?,’ where I 
try to show how the Lewisian proposal should be properly understood, or otherwise amended: valu-
ing is desired desiring, or perhaps merely desiring one does not desire against. 
8 This is straightforward if one characterizes, as I am inclined to do, evaluative predicates as those that suf-
fice for ‘is good’ (or ‘is bad’). One should expect the claim also to hold, I imagine, in some alternative 
formulation is adopted. 
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have seen, settling this depends on the status of the relevant flexible and rigid bicondi-
tionals 
x is good iff we are disposed to value x in appropriate reflective conditions. 
x is good iff we, as we actually are, are disposed to value x in appropriate reflective 
conditions, as they actually are. 
which in turn depends on what turns out to be the intuitively proper description of 
suitably neutrally described counterfactual target situations. I claim that one of these is 
the generalized version of the Moral Twin Earth submitted in related contexts and for 
related aims by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons,9 which I will call Evaluative Twin 
Earth or ETE for short.  
 Take something that I am —and hence we are— actually disposed to value under 
appropriate reflective conditions: (say) Santi’s lying to me on some particular occasion. 
We, as we actually are, are disposed to value Santi’s lying to me under appropriate re-
flective conditions, as they actually are, and hence it is —actually— good. But I could 
be different. In particular my dispositions to value this particular lie under those rele-
vant conditions could be suitably more “deontologist,” as it were. I could be such that 
I am not disposed to value it under appropriate reflective conditions. So let us con-
sider a situation in which I am like that, but agrees with the actual situation in as much 
as it’s possible compatibly with this difference, and call it ETE. We, as we are in ETE, 
are not disposed to value Santi’s lying to me under appropriate reflective conditions.  
 So far, again, we have the relevant target situation, appropriately neutrally de-
scribed, as no hypothesis about the extension of ‘is good’ with respect to ETE is intro-
duced. Hence, that it is a possibility is something agreeable by both defenders of the 
view that ‘is good’ signifies a real property and defenders of the view that it signifies a 
flexible one.10 The crucial question is again: how should it be intuitively described with 
respect to ‘is good’? In particular, is it true or false, intuitively, ‘Santi’s lying to me is 
good’ when evaluated with respect to ETE? My own intuitions, and as I understand him, 
Lewis’ also, are that it should be false with respect to ETE. But then, if ‘Santi’s lying to 
me is good’ is false with respect to ETE and ‘We, as we actually are, are disposed to 
value Santi’s lying to me under appropriate reflective conditions, as they actually are’ is 
true with respect to ETE, the rigidified biconditional is only contingently true with re-
spect to the actual world. Hence, ‘is good’ signifies a flexible property, and not a real 
one. Hence, arguably all evaluative predicates, and not only soft ones, do so as well: 
                                                     
9 See Horgan & Timmons (1991), (1992a), (1992b), (1996) & (2000a). Their own positive views might dif-
fer from mine, though. For their views see inter alia Horgan & Timmons (2000b). 
10 It is worth emphasizing that the availability of the Evaluate Twin Earth per se merely depends the rele-
vant psychological facts being contingent and hence that it is a possibility is something that all the 
disputants have reason to accept. As we are about to see, how is it to be intuitively described in terms 
of the predicate ‘is good’ is what would settle the question as to whether the predicate signifies a 
property of one or the other kind. I am indebt here to an anonymous referee for this journal.  
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the intuitive flexibility of values is then vindicated and thereby evaluative realism is 
rendered unintuitive.11
 As I said at the beginning, people quite often claim, nonetheless, that they do not 
share the relevant flexibility supporting intuitions. As I tend to think that they do have 
them after all, the aim of this paper is to offer two considerations in the light of which 
some might revise what they took to be their own realist supporting intuitions when 
the proper description of the ETE is concerned. These considerations exploit what I 
take to be counterintuitive consequences of the realist alternative. If people initially 
claiming that they do not share the relevant flexibility supporting intuitions also find 
those consequences counterintuitive, that would provide them with reasons for revis-
ing what they took to be their own realist supporting intuitions when the proper de-
scription of the ETE is concerned.12 Of course some realist would be ready to bit the 
bullets, and hence the considerations cannot constitute a refutation of the alternative, 
realist, approach to values. 
3. Internalism vs. Evaluative Realism  
John Mackie famously once developed an argument from queerness against there ac-
tually being objective goods, where: 
An objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because of any 
contingent fact of this person, or every person, is so constituted that he desires this end, but just 
because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow built into it. (Mackie 1977, p. 112) 
Here he is pointing to what it is sometimes called the practicality of the evaluative or in-
ternalism, roughly: values, whatever they are, have a to-be-pursuedness somehow built 
into them. That certainly seems something constitutive of values as we conceive them. 
So it is according to Lewis: 
If something is a value, and if someone is of the appropriate ‘we’, and if he is in ideal conditions, 
then it follows that he will value it. And if he values it, and if he desires as he desire to desire, 
then he will desire it. And if he desires it, and his desire is not outweighed by other conflicting 
desires, and if he has instrumental rationality to do what serves his desires according to his be-
liefs, then he will pursue it. And if the relevant beliefs are near enough true, then he will pursue it 
as effectively as possible. A conceptual connection between value and motivation. But a multi-
fariously iffy connection. Nothing less iffy would be credible. But still less it is credible that there 
is no connection at all. (Lewis 1989, p. 72) 
I propose to state this internalist claim about values thus: 
(I) It is necessary and a priori that: If something is good, we would desire it under 
appropriate reflective conditions (weakness of will and the like aside). 
                                                     
11 For further details and discussion see López de Sa (2003). 
12 Notice that, for the strategy to be successful, some of those claiming that do not share the flexibility 
supporting intuitions should find the consequences counterintuitive without being antecedently ready 
to reject realists views on the matter. And, in my own experience, some do so find them. Hence the 
considerations are not worthless. I am indebt here to an anonymous referee for this journal. 
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Evaluative realism cannot account for (I). The reason is straightforward: realism en-
tails that the relevant flexible rd biconditional would be at most contingently true. But 
any counterexample to its necessity is such that the embedded conditional in (I) would 
be false with respect to it. Hence it would not be necessary with respect to the actual 
world, and hence (I) is false. 
 Evaluative objectivists, who hold that evaluative properties are fully objective, typi-
cally agree and even emphasize this, but then give (I) up and go externalist. They usu-
ally claim that that is indeed a virtue of their position, given that the externalist com-
ponent is independently motivated. Some of them stress what is an undeniable fact: 
that sometimes people fail to be moved by what is good, even by what they know is 
good. That would challenge a strengthened version of (I) having it that values directly 
motivate the relevant subjects by directly issuing in them the relevant desire. That 
would be, I agree, as a matter of fact not true, let alone necessarily and a priori so: we 
have already considered cases of weakness of will in which we fail to desire as we 
value. These by itself would refute the strengthened version of (I). But (I) is suitably 
weaker, not only on that score, but importantly in requiring that one should value the 
good only under certain, appropriately reflective, conditions. So in order to refute (I) 
you will need a case of something which is good but such that the appropriate valuers 
don’t desire it at all, not even under the appropriate reflective conditions and when their 
will is strong enough to desire as they desire to desire. But this seems quite a hard 
thing to have. This case, one is inclined to say with Lewis, is simply not credible. 
 Someone like David Brink would agree with a lot of this, although he would put it 
the other way round, as it were: 
[T]he internalist cannot rest content with the extensional claim that everyone is in fact motivated 
[by what is morally good]. Any externalist could claim that. The internalist about motives claims 
that it is true in virtue of the concept of morality that [moral goodness] necessarily motivate. Ac-
cording to the internalist, then, it must be conceptually impossible for someone to [know that 
something is morally good] and remain unmoved. This fact raises a problem for internalism: in-
ternalism makes the amoralist conceptually impossible. (Brink 1986, pp. 29-30)13
The dialectical situation is weird enough, though, for the conceptual impossibility of 
such an amoralist, who is not at all disposed to desire something that is good, even 
under appropriate reflective conditions and with a strong enough will, far from raising 
a problem for internalism is precisely what motivates it. The reason for (I) can be put 
by the thought that such an amoralist is conceptually impossible. 
 Do we have here an irremovable clash of intuitions? This could be the case, of 
course. But I take it to be dialectically fruitful enough, for as I said some realists do in-
deed seem to appeal to (I) in rejecting objectivism and to claim instead that evaluative 
(and moral) properties are, though real, somehow more subjective by being essentially 
tied to (evaluative) responses, in the same way as colors are according to the disposi-
tionalist. But this move is unsuccessful. 
                                                     
13 In the original passage, instead of the inserted claims about moral values Brink has claims about moral 
considerations and judgments, but I take it that he would certainly, even readily, concur with what I say 
about the properties and facts. I’ll consider internalism concerning judgments in the next section 14.  
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 In his response to Mackie, John McDowell took an “analogist” line of this kind, by 
arguing that the model for real evaluative properties should not be looked for in the 
case of primary qualities, as Mackie did, but in the case of secondary qualities: 
[I]t seems impossible —at least on reflection— to take seriously the idea of something that is like 
a primary quality in being simple there, independently of human sensibility, but is nevertheless 
(not conditionally on contingencies about human sensibility) such as to elicit some ‘attitude’ or 
state of will from someone who becomes aware of it. (McDowell 1985, p. 111) 
Shifting to a secondary-quality analogy renders irrelevant any worry about how something that is 
brutely there could nevertheless stand in an internal relation to some exercise of human sensibili-
ties. Values are not brutely there —not there independently of our sensibility— any more than 
colours are: thought, as were colours, this does not stop us supposing that they are there inde-
pendently of any particular apparent experience of them. (McDowell 1985, p. 120) 
I don’t want to go here into McDowell’s specific views concerning values —nor col-
ors, for that matter. Rather, I want to claim that to the extent that one tries to ac-
commodate (I) by claiming that values are real even if not fully objective properties, 
but rather dispositions to produce certain evaluative response in (rigidly) specified 
subjects under (rigidly specified) conditions; to that extent the attempt fails. For dis-
positionalists about value do not deal with (I) any more effectively than objectivists 
did (as has been also explicitly emphasized with respect to the original Moral Twin 
Earth by Holland (2001)). And this is so given that the previous remark about the in-
compatibility of realism and (I) did not appeal to any specific view about the nature of 
being good besides the assumption that it was a real property and, hence, applies in 
particular to the relevant, secondary, dispositions.  
 The dispositionalist about values can of course at this point simply deny that (I) is 
true, and try to be comforted (say) with the a priori component of it, as we have seen 
evaluative objectivists do. The issue as to whether internalism about values is right or 
not depends on exactly the same intuitions that would support more directly the real-
ity of the flexibility of values. Hence this is not an independent consideration for set-
tling the issue. But given that, as we have seen, some people mistakenly think that they 
can accommodate internalism about values within a realist framework, the considera-
tion is worth making, as it is capable of making some revise what they took to be their 
own realist supporting intuitions.14
4. Evaluative Judgment and Motivation 
Internalism in meta-ethics is sometimes intended as a related, though distinct, claim 
asserting an a priori and necessary connection between evaluative (moral) judgment and 
motivation. According to the flexible account of section 2, there is such a connection. 
Lewis says of it that  
it is even iffier that the connection between value itself and motivation; and again I say that if it 
were less iffy, it would be less credible. If someone believes that something is a value, and if he 
                                                     
14 I elaborate on the dilemma against McDowell in López de Sa (2006), and he responds in McDowell 
(2006). I hope to discuss the issue further elsewhere.  
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has come to this belief by the canonical method [of putting himself in ideal conditions and find-
ing whether he values it], and if he has remained in ideal conditions afterward or else retained the 
desire to desire that he had when in ideal conditions, then it follows that he values that thing. 
And if he desires as he desires to desire, then he desires that thing; and so on as before. (Lewis 
1989, p. 73) 
One could here wonder whether it is really true that were it less iffy, it would be less 
credible. For the belief one reaches by the canonical method, if it includes succeeding in 
achieving the relevant conditions, would indeed constitute evaluative (moral) knowledge. 
But as it is sometimes stressed, the conceptual connection between evaluative judg-
ment and motivation seems to be independent of whether the judgment is in fact true: 
false beliefs about what is good could motivate just as much as true ones (see for in-
stance Dreier (1990). But the canonical method might not be interpreted as necessarily 
successful: it is sufficient that one reaches what one takes to be the relevant conditions. 
So we have the following: 
If someone believes that something is a value, and if he has come to this belief by 
the canonical method of putting himself in what he takes to be ideal conditions and 
finding whether he values it, and if he has remained in what he takes to be ideal con-
ditions afterward or else retained the desire to desire that he had when in what he 
takes to be ideal conditions, then it follows that he values that thing. And if he de-
sires as he desires to desire, then he desires that thing. 
That is so even if he is not right in what he takes to be the relevant conditions, and 
hence, even if one’s belief is in fact not true. Now, to the extent that one typically 
forms one’s evaluative judgment by trying to approximate the canonical method, one’s 
judgment typically entails that one is disposed to desire it, under appropriate reflective 
conditions (weakness of will aside).15 But even if one typically does it, one need not: 
If someone reached the same judgement in some non-canonical way —as he might— that would 
imply nothing about his valuing or desiring or pursuing. (Lewis 1989, p. 73) 
But this, it seems to me, accords pretty well with the common-sense view. 
 Can the realist account at least for this internalism about evaluative judgement? 
Brink thinks not. I tend to think he is right, although arguing for such a further in-
compatibility would involve some complications.16 In any case, the consideration that 
I wanted to offer was the previous one. 
5. The Intuitively Properly Missing Evaluative Explanations 
Mark Johnston has recently argued against the view that colors and other manifest 
properties are response-dependent, when a property is response-dependent in his terms iff 
                                                     
15 If I understand them right, this is close to what is argued in Jackson & Pettit (1995), see also Jackson 
(1998). 
16 One in my view plausible sufficient condition would be what some philosophers have argued was right 
in verificationism: for a family of properties like evaluative ones it should be possible to determine 
sometimes that some of them are instantiated.  
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it is a flexible property in mine.17 Abstracting from the details, it runs more or less 
thus: the idea that some properties are perceptible requires “receptivity”, that there 
should be causal explanations of the general dispositions of the subjects to elicit the 
responses under the conditions in terms of those properties. But those explanations would 
go missing if the properties were flexible: satisfying receptivity entails that the relevant 
flexible rd biconditionals are contingent. Hence the label Missing Explanation Argument or 
MEA for short. 
 This provides in my view a further consideration that could make one revise what 
one took to be one’s own realist intuitions in the evaluative case. According to the 
MEA, if a property is flexible, there will certainly be “deep” causal explanations of the 
general dispositions of subjects, an explanation that will appeal to certain real proper-
ties that unify the relevant instances in the actual world, but those will not appeal to 
the flexible properties themselves. But it is precisely this that intuitively seems to oc-
cur with respect to evaluative properties. Take a soft case. Our general disposition, as 
we actually are, to be amused by some things in appropriately attentive conditions, as 
they actually are, will certainly have casual explanations in terms of real properties: 
perhaps we are actually disposed to be amused by some things because they make us 
expect a connection between ideas that we know are not so connected. But intuitively 
we would not offer as a causal explanation of our dispositions to be amused that things 
are funny. And mutatis mutandis for the general case: one should expect there to be a 
complicated causal explanation of why it is that we are actually disposed to value cer-
tain things and not others in the conditions, but intuitively it would not do as a causal 
explanation that they are good. 
 As before, this consideration again falls short of constituting a full-blooded argu-
ment against evaluative realism. As an argument it could be seen as presupposing that 
                                                     
17 His characterization of response-dependence is: 
[A] property, Being F, is response-dependent if there is some predicate ‘is f’ which expresses the 
property (i.e., whose extension across possible worlds is just the things which have the property) 
such that some substantial way of filling out ‘R’, ‘S’ and ‘C’ makes 
x is f if and only if x is disposed to produce x-directed response R in all actual and possible 
subjects S under conditions C 
a priori and necessary; (Johnston 1998, p. 9) 
once it is required  
that the canonical biconditionals are not merely superficial necessities produced by “rigidifying” 
on a relation that is itself contingent. The equivalence “x=Neptune if and only if x = the planet in 
the actual world which causes perturbations in the orbit of Uranus” is superficially necessary in 
this way. (Johnston 1998, p. 10) 
That the proper target of the argument are response-dependent properties so understood and hence not 
the views that most people submit under the label of response-dependent accounts of colors —
dispositionalist theories of colors— is something I stress in my unpublished ‘The Explanations that are 
Missed according to the Missing Explanation Argument.’ This, acknowledged by Johnston himself (1998, 
37), is rightly emphasized by Haukioja (2000, 109), but apparently has escaped other critics, like López de 
Sa (2000) and Miller (2001). 
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the relevant causal explanatoriness of the property in question vis-à-vis the relevant 
responses is a necessary condition for its reality, in the sense I am using the notion. 
Now, the evaluative realist could complain, one could grant that it would be a suffi-
cient condition, and one could even grant, as occurred in the premises of the MEAs, 
that concerning colors, or any other kind of perceptible property, it is a necessary condi-
tion. But why should it be in general? In particular, why should it be the case that for 
evaluative properties to be real they must be causally explanatory vis-à-vis the relevant 
responses in the way envisaged in which they intuitively aren’t? That is, as I under-
stand it, the content of Nagel’s complaint (quoted in Sturgeon 1985, p. 235): 
it begs the question to assume that explanatory necessity is the test of reality in this area. (Nagel 
1980, p. 114)18
Fair enough, I’m inclined to acknowledge. But as with the previous issue concerning 
internalism, I take it that inasmuch as reflection upon the tension between evaluative 
realism and internalism about values could make one revise what one took to be real-
ist supporting intuitions concerning the proper intuitive descriptions of the evaluative 
target situations, reflection upon the present issue about causal explanatoriness could 
oblige one to make a similar revision. This being so, and even if it falls short of consti-
tuting an argument against evaluative realism, I hope the consideration is not devoid 
of interest. 
6. Revisiting Evaluative Explanations 
I have just suggested that some evaluative realists explicitly endorse the —counter-
intuitive, as I take them to be— consequences of their views: externalism and causal 
explanatory impotence. The latter may come as something of a surprise, in that some 
other evaluative realists, notably Nicholas Sturgeon, are usually seen precisely as de-
fending that there are moral explanations of the sort that I claim evaluative realists and 
anti-realists alike acknowledge that intuitively there aren’t. In this section I want to de-
fend that this impression concerning Sturgeon does not stand up to a closer analysis, 
and that his arguments are not incompatible with what I have been claiming so far. 
 In his classic paper ‘Moral Explanations’ (1985), Sturgeon aims to rebut a claim he 
attributes to Harman,19 according to which “even if we assumed the existence of moral 
facts they would still appear explanatorily irrelevant” (Sturgeon 1985, p. 237), for dis-
cussing which, as he observes, he is free to, and does, “assume, for the sake of the ar-
gument, that there are moral facts” (Sturgeon 1985, p. 237). One could think at this 
point that that is not a substantive assumption, amounting to something like “there 
are true simple modal statements.” Not so: as he himself makes explicit, his assump-
tion has a much richer content —and, as we are going to see, essentially so— that 
those moral facts involve moral properties that are, or supervene upon more basic, 
                                                     
18 As I understand her, something like this is also the view of Judith J. Thomson, see Harman & Thom-
son (1996), Thomson (1998a) and (1998b). 
19 See footnote 21. 
 
Dan LÓPEZ DE SA 292 
natural properties (Sturgeon 1985, p. 247), so that for anything that has them, “could 
not have differed in its moral quality without differing in those other [more basic fea-
tures that makes it have it] as well. (Sturgeon 1985, p. 249). 
 Let me say a few words on supervenience. There are good (in part a posteriori) 
reasons for holding that everything supervenes upon the way the world naturally is. 
How to characterize exactly the content of this rough claim is, of course, by no means 
easy. But it will be clear that evaluative properties such as the Lewisian, flexible, ap-
proach conceives them, do clearly supervene on the natural in this sense. (At least, they 
do so on the assumption that psychological entities, to which evaluative ones flexibly 
reduce, do.) Furthermore, in the literature there is also a claim sometimes intended as 
a supervenience claim such that anyone is committed (at any moment) to evaluate si-
milarly things that she judges not to differ naturally. That also holds, again obviously, 
for flexible response-dependent values. What is not true according to the flexible pro-
posal is that evaluative properties supervene locally on natural entities, and more in 
general, on entities which are independent of the relevant valuers. Indeed for any tar-
get situation, if its proper description favors a flexible account, then it constitutes a 
counterexample of the relevant local supervenience claim. And conversely, the rele-
vant realist alternatives could indeed be alternatively characterized by holding the rele-
vant local supervenience claims.20
 It is then clear that the content of Sturgeon’s assumption is, in my terms, that 
moral properties are real properties. This is OK for evaluating Sturgeon’s target: that 
even if moral properties were real properties, they would be explanatorily irrelevant. 
And his argument is straightforward: 
[C]onsider Harman’s own example in which you see the children igniting a cat and react immedi-
ately with the thought that it is wrong. Is it true, as Harman claims, that the assumption that the 
children are really doing something wrong is “totally irrelevant” to any reasonable explanation of 
your making that judgment? Would you, for example, have reacted in just the same way, with the 
thought that the action is wrong, even if what they were doing hadn’t been wrong, and could we 
explain your reaction equally well on that assumption? … [I]f what they are actually doing is 
wrong, and if moral properties are, as many writers have held, supervenient on natural ones, then in order to 
imagine them not doing something wrong we are going to have to suppose their action different 
form the actual one in some of its natural properties as well. So our question becomes: Even if 
the children have been doing something else, something just different enough not to be wrong, 
would you have taken them even so to be doing something wrong? (Sturgeon 1985, p. 247, my 
emphasis) 
And the answer, I am ready to grant, could be ‘no.’ Suitably generalized, and in our 
terms: we have granted that there will be deep empirical explanations of our issuing 
the relevant evaluative responses when confronted with instances of evaluative prop-
erties, and our general capacity of so issuing them. If it is assumed that the relevant ex-
planatory properties are the evaluative properties, then evaluative properties wouldn’t 
be explanatorily irrelevant. That is something that a defender of the flexibility of val-
                                                     
20 For further discussion, see López de Sa 2005. 
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ues could, and I think should, accept.21 But that is not an “argument to the best expla-
nation” for evaluative realism, though it is sometimes seen in this way.22
Conclusion 
Evaluative realism, I have claimed, should be characterized as denying the flexibility of 
values. But, I have also claimed, the intuitive description of the relevant counterfactual tar-
get situations, like the Evaluative Twin Earth, does support flexibility. As some people of-
ten claim they disagree with this, I have tried to make explicit some of the consequences 
of the relevant alternative realist descriptions, in the hope that some will acknowledge their 
counterintuitive character and revise thereby what they took to be their own realist sup-
porting intuition. According to some evaluative realists, the flexibility supporting intuitions 
about the proper description of the relevant counterfactual target situations would have 
their own counterintuitive consequences. To the best of my knowledge, it is usually 
claimed that flexibility would have unacceptable relativistic consequences with respect to 
the evaluative domain, for instance being incapable of accounting for the fact that people 
disagree in normal conversations about evaluative issues. I do think that flexibility has rela-
tivistic consequences, but I would resist the claim that they are unacceptable. Rather, they 
are what intuitively seems predictable, in particular when we attend to a presuppositional 
element, to the effect that participants in conversations are relevantly like the speaker, 
which is congenial to the flexible proposal.  
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